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--IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS --
CHAD CRAPO, : 
Court of Appeals 
Applicant-Petitioner, : Case No. 950718-CA 
vs. : 
Industrial Commission 
WHEREHOUSE ENTERTAINMENT, : Number: 95-95-0069 
INC.; ITT HARTFORD; and 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, : Priority 7 
Defendants-Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Petition for Review by Applicant-Petitioner, Chad 
Crapo, is from an Order of the Industrial Commission, State of 
Utah, dated October 10, 1995. This Court has jurisdiction over 
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-86 and Utah 
Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(a) (1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR DECISION ON APPEAL 
The issues before this Court are: (1) Whether Mr. Crapo's 
attempted suicide constitutes an "accident" under the Worker' 
Compensation -Act as defined by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah; and (2) Whether Mr. Crapo's 
injuries arising from his attempted suicide were "purposely self-
1 
inflicted," thus barring recovery under Utah Code Annotated §35-
1-45 (1988) . 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Respondents dispute Mr. Crapo's characterization of the 
Commission's ruling as the equivalent of a Rule 12(b)(6) judgment 
on the pleadings or a Rule 56 summary judgment. At the time of 
the scheduled evidentiary hearing on June 2, 1995, "the parties 
agreed that the Administrative Law Judge could determine the 
issues based on the hearing memoranda prepared by the parties and 
depositions of the applicant and of Emily Smith." (R. at 131.) 
Mr. Crapo's counsel agreed that it would be an unnecessary burden 
for Mr. Crapo to testify at the hearing since his hearing 
testimony would not differ from the testimony contained in his 
deposition. The ALJ then took the matter under advisement. 
After reviewing the "pleadings and depositions and the file 
contained in the [case]," the ALJ prepared Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, denying Mr. Crapo's claim for 
workers' compensation benefits. (R. at 131-136.) A copy of the 
ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order is attached 
as Exhibit VXA" . Thus, no summary disposition occurred before the 
ALJ. 
2 
Mr. Crapo filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial 
Commission on June 28, 1995. (R. at 138-153.) In his Motion for 
Review, Mr. Crapo erroneously characterized the ALJ's order as a 
ruling on the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. In fact, Defendants 
had never submitted a motion to dismiss. Rather, the parties had 
prepared and submitted hearing memoranda outlining their 
positions on the issues presented in the case. (R. at 30-50.) 
Then, at the beginning of the scheduled evidentiary hearing, the 
parties agreed that live witness testimony would be unnecessary 
since the depositions contained all of the relevant testimony. 
The parties, however, did not stipulate to the facts. Rather, 
the ALJ examined the deposition testimony and medical records and 
then made Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. Had 
the ALJ simply ruled on a motion to dismiss, he would not have 
prepared these findings; rather, he would have simply accepted 
Mr. Crapo's version of the facts as true. Instead, the Findings 
of Fact reflect that the ALJ weighed the deposition testimony and 
made certain findings of fact regarding conflicting versions of 
the events in question. 
On the Motion for Review, the Industrial Commission 
mistakenly accepted Mr. Crapo's characterization of the Order as 
a ruling on a motion to dismiss. The Commission therefore 
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accepted Mr. Crapo's assertion that the evidence need be 
construed in the light most favorable to Mr. Crapo. 
Notwithstanding this procedural advantage to Mr. Crapo, the 
Commission ruled against Mr. Crapo and specifically adopted the 
findings of fact and legal analysis set forth in the decision of 
the ALJ. (R. at 173A-173D.) Accordingly, this Court is not 
reviewing a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment as 
asserted by Mr. Crapo. Rather, this Court is reviewing an Order 
which was entered, by the parties' stipulation, on the basis of 
deposition testimony, medical records and other file material. 
This Order contains Findings of Fact which were made by the ALJ 
after weighing this evidence, and the ALJ's conclusions of law 
were made by applying the law to these factual findings. 
Since these proceedings were commenced after January 1, 
1988, this Court's review of the Order is governed by the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"). Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-l 
to -22 (1993). 
A. Findings of Fact 
1. Substantial Evidence Test 
"When a petitioner challenges an agency's findings of fact, 
[the court] [is] required to uphold the findings if they are 
supported by 'substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
4 
whole record before the court.'" VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Comm'n 
of Utah, 901 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (4) (g) (1994)). "Substantial evidence has 
been defined as 'that quantum and quality of relevant evidence 
that is adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id. (quoting U.S. 
West Communications, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 882 P.2d 141, 
146 (Utah 1994)). "It is not [the court's] prerogative on review 
to reweigh the evidence. Instead, [the court] defer[s] to the 
Commission's findings because, when reasonably conflicting views 
arise, it is the Commission's province to draw inferences and 
resolve these conflicts." Id. (quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 83, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). 
2. Duty to Marshall the Evidence 
As a threshold matter, before the Court will "subject an 
agency's findings to the substantial evidence test, the party 
challenging the findings 'must marshall all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting 
facts, the [agency's] findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence.'" Id. (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of 
Equalization, 799 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1988)). As this Court 
explained in West Valley City v. Majestic Inc. Co., 818 P.2d 
1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1981), u[t]he challenge must present, 
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in a comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists." (Emphasis added.) Then " [a]fter constructing 
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger 
must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of the 
flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the 
court's findings resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous." 
Id. "Appellants often overlook or disregard the heavy burden to 
marshall evidence. When the duty to marshall is not properly 
discharged, [appellate courts] refuse to consider the merits of 
the challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid." 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
In the present case, Appellant has made no effort to 
marshall the evidence that supports the ALJ's Findings of Fact. 
Thus, this Court should accept those Findings of Fact as valid. 
B. Interpretation of Law 
Under UAPA, this Court reviews "statutory interpretations by 
agencies for correctness, giving no deference to the agency's 
discretion to interpret the statute./M Id. (quoting Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 856 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993)). In Cross v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 1202, 
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1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this Court held that the Workers' 
Compensation Act does not expressly or impliedly grant discretion 
to the Commission to interpret the specific statutory language. 
Accordingly, this Court reviews the Commission's interpretation 
of the Act for correctness. 
C. Application of the Law 
In Employers' Reinsurance Fund, this Court held that every 
agency decision reviewed under UAPA "necessarily involves an 
express statutory grant of discretion to the agency to apply the 
law at issue." 856 P.2d at 650 n.3 (emphasis added). "When an 
agency has discretion to apply its factual findings to the law, 
[the court] will not disturb the agency's application 'unless its 
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality.'" VanLeeuwen, 901 P.2d at 283 (quoting Pro-Benefit 
Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989)). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The determinative provision is Utah Code Ann § 35-1-45 
(1988), which reads as follows: 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee who is 
killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of 
his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be 
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paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the 
injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, 
and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of 
death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in 
this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and 
medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this 
chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance 
carrier and not on the employee. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below 
This case involves a disputed workers' compensation claim. 
Mr. Crapo filed an Application for Hearing with the Industrial 
Commission on January 12, 1995 after he had been denied workers' 
compensation benefits for injuries arising out of his attempted 
suicide. (R. at 6.) In the Application for Hearing, Mr. Crapo 
alleged that the pressure from being interrogated by his employer 
for theft caused a "temporary self-destructive compulsion that 
resulted in a gunshot wound." (R. at 6.) An answer was filed by 
Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc., and/or ITT Hartford presenting 
the following defenses: 
(1) Mr. Crapo had not sustained an injury by accident 
as defined by the laws of the State of Utah; (2) Mr. 
Crapo had failed to sustain an accident arising out of 
and in the course of his employment; (3) Mr. Crapo's 
injury arose from a purposely self-inflicted gunshot 
wound in his own home; and (4) Mr. Crapo's injuries 
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from the gunshot wound lacked medical or legal 
causation to his employment. 
(R. at 10-12.) The parties took the depositions of Mr. Crapo and 
his supervisor at the time of the accident, Emily Wright Smith. 
(R. at 183-314.) The parties then prepared hearing memoranda for 
the judge on the pertinent issues. 
On the scheduled hearing date, the parties agreed at a 
sidebar conference with the ALJ that the deposition testimony and 
medical records contained all of the evidence necessary for the 
judge to determine the issues. (R. at 131.) While Mr. Crapo was 
present at the hearing and ready to testify, counsel agreed that 
it would be an unnecessary burden on Mr. Crapo to give live 
testimony since he would only repeat his deposition testimony. 
Judge Allen thus took the matter under advisement. 
After reviewing the pleadings, depositions and medical 
records, Judge Allen prepared Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order, and entered the same on June 8, 19 95. (R. at 
131-137.) Judge Allen concluded that Mr. Crapo's injuries had 
been "purposely self-inflicted" and thus dismissed the claim as 
non-compensable. (R. at 134-136.) Mr. Crapo filed a Motion for 
Review with the Industrial Commission on June 28, 1995. (R. at 
138-152.) On October 10, 1995, the Industrial Commission 
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affirmed the decision of the ALJ, adopting the facts and legal 
analysis as set forth in Judge Allen's decision. (R. at 173A -
173D.) Mr. Crapo filed a Petition for Writ of Review with this 
Court on November 6, 1995. (R. at 174.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The petitioner, Chad Crapo, was hired by Pegasus Records, 
the predecessor in interest to Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc., on 
January 25, 1994. (R. at 191.) According to Mr. Crapo, he was 
raised in a home with the belief that it is inappropriate to 
steal. (R. at 191.) Nevertheless, by April 1994, he and a co-
employee, Shawn Dalton, had begun stealing various items from the 
store. (R. at 197, 202-203, 205-206.) These items consisted of 
three CD disks, one Sony disk player, and four laser disks. (R. 
at 52.) Mr. Crapo was also giving unauthorized employee 
discounts to frequent customers of the store. (R. at 52, 199-
200.) Mr. Crapo's thefts were reported to his manager, Emily 
Wright Smith, by two different co-employees. (R. at 266, 271-
272.) Ms. Smith testified that she warned Chad Crapo and Shawn 
Dalton, but that her warnings went unheeded. (R. at 266, 271-
272.) According to Ms. Smith, the only thing that changed was 
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they became a little "sneakier" in their activities. (R. at 
268. ) 1 
Ms. Smith contacted her Loss Control Manager, Jeff Gimber, 
regarding the thefts. Mr. Gimber instructed Ms. Smith to observe 
Mr. Crapo's activities and to compile a file. (R. at 268, 274.) 
After Ms. Smith observed Mr. Crapo stuffing voided receipts into 
the ceiling of the store after hours, she contacted Mr. Gimber 
and he informed her that he would come up to Utah from southern 
California the following day. (R. at 173.) 
On May 19, 1994, Mr. Gimber arrived at the store. (R. at 
276.) Ms. Smith instructed Mr. Crapo to report to the District 
Manager's office, which was in the back portion of the store. 
(R. at 176.) There Mr. Gimber confronted Mr. Crapo about the 
thefts that had been taking place at the store. After being 
informed that the police could be involved if he did not 
cooperate, Mr. Crapo confessed that he had been stealing items 
from the store and giving unauthorized discounts to customers. 
(R. at 280.) He was then left alone in the office to write out 
1
 In Mr. Crapo's "Statement of Facts," he claims that he did 
not intend to keep the items he stole. (Appellant's Brief at 7.) 
Nevertheless, Mr. Crapo admitted in his deposition that he has 
never returned any of the merchandise. (R. at 205.) 
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his confession and list the items he had stolen.2 (R. at 213, 
281. ) 
Rather than a "forceful and relentless interrogation," Ms. 
Smith, in response to questions presented by Mr. Crapo's counsel, 
characterized Mr. Gimber's conversation with Mr. Crapo as 
follows: 
Q: What did Mr. Gimber do? 
A: He started out by asking Chad if there was 
anything he wanted to tell him. He told Chad that 
he knew that there were things going on in the 
store and that Chad should be honest with him and 
let him know exactly what was going on. 
Q: So he asked Chad that question, he asked Chad to 
tell him what was going on? 
A: Not in those exact words, but he asked him what 
was happening in the store, if he could tell him 
anything that he was maybe doing wrong, or that 
anyone else was doing wrong. 
Q: That's how the conversation started? 
A: That's how the conversation started. 
Q: And what was the response? 
2
 Contrary to Mr. Crapo's Statement of Facts that Mr. Gimber 
"forced confessions that included a number of things that Chad 
did not do," (Appellant's Brief at 8), Mr. Crapo admitted that 
Mr. Gimber did not "squeeze" a confession out of him. (R. at 209-
210.) Furthermore, the statement Mr. Crapo prepared is entirely 
in his own handwriting and was prepared with no one in the room 
with him at the time. (R. at 52, 213.) 
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A: The response was that he didn't say anything, 
starting off, and then Jeff went on and on about 
it. He pulled out the files and told him that we 
had records of what was happening, and he told 
Chad that he should cooperate, and Chad did. 
Q: When you say "went on and on," what did you mean 
by that? 
A: He told Chad that he knew about the Discman, and 
he knew about different things that were being 
taken from the store. I can't remember exactly 
what he said, but that we actually had been 
watching him for quite a few weeks -- that I had 
been watching him for quite a few weeks. 
Q: What else was said? 
A: I can't really remember the whole conversation. I 
just know that he had confronted Chad on what he 
had taken, told Chad that he needed to cooperate, 
and Chad did and he told him what he had taken. 
We were in there for quite awhile. There were 
lots of pauses and silence where nobody would say 
anything. 
(R. at 278-79.)(Emphasis supplied.)3 
Mr. Crapo further claims that during the alleged 
"interrogation," he was confronted with "sketchy hearsay 
information" that Smith had obtained from an unidentified source 
regarding another possible theft by Mr. Crapo. (Appellant's 
Brief at 8.) Rather, according to Ms. Smith's deposition 
3
 Ms. Smith was not trying to protect her employer with her 
testimony. She left her employment with Wherehouse shortly 
following Mr. Crapo's suicide attempt. 
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testimony, both Chad Crapo and Shawn Dalton bragged to three of 
their co-employees (who later told Ms. Smith) that they had been 
involved in a theater theft. (R. at 286.) Moreover, Ms. Smith 
specifically stated the names of the co-employees who related 
this admission to her. (R. at 287.) 
Mr. Gimber then instructed Ms. Smith to escort Mr. Crapo 
home to retrieve the stolen property. (R. at 285.) When they 
arrived at Mr. Crapo's house,4 Mr. Crapo asked to excuse himself 
to use the restroom. Instead, Mr. Crapo went to a room attached 
to the garage where he loaded his 20-gauge shotgun. (R. at 218.) 
He was alone. He placed the shotgun in his mouth and pulled the 
4
 Mr. Crapo asserts that when they arrived at his home, Ms. 
Smith entered Mr. Crapo's home "without invitation." 
(Appellant's Brief at 9.) Mr. Crapo's claim is deliberately 
false based upon the fact that Mr. Crapo's counsel elicited the 
following deposition testimony from Ms. Smith: 
Q: [By Mr. Black] When you got to the house, did 
Chad invite you in? 
A: [By Ms. Smith] He did. He said, "That's where my 
room is, right there." 
(R. at 289.) (Emphasis supplied.) Moreover, Applicant's 
deposition testimony does not claim an illegal entry: 
Q: [By Mr. Dyer] Okay. So you drive from the store to 
your home, you have this brief conversation with Ms. 
Wright. What happens when you get to your house? 
A: [By Mr. Crapo] Get out of the car. 
Q: [By Mr. Dyer] Did you both get our of the car? 
A: [By Mr. Crapo] Yes, we both got out of the car. And 
she -- I opened the door to my house and walked in, and 
she followed me. 
(R. at 216.) 
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trigger. (R. at 218.) The resulting blast did not kill Mr. 
Crapo, but did result in the loss of some teeth and a portion of 
his jaw. (R. at 132-133.) Mr. Crapo then loaded another shell, 
but fortunately placed it in the chamber upside down. (R. at 
219.) According to Mr. Crapo, his suicide attempt was an 
impulsive gesture. (R. at 132, 220.) As a result of his suicide 
attempt, Mr. Crapo has incurred medical expenses of approximately 
$20,000. (R. at 230.) Moreover, his private insurance will not 
cover the medical expense because it does not cover suicide 
attempts. (R. at 230.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Under Allen, an "accident" is an "unexpected or unintended 
occurrence that may be either the cause or the result of an 
injury." 729 P.2d at 22 (emphasis in original). The ALJ 
correctly concluded that neither the cause nor the result of Mr. 
Crapo's injuries was unexpected or unintended. There is no 
evidence that Mr. Crapo suffered from a psychiatric illness or 
disorder at the time of the injury. Rather, Mr. Crapo's 
deposition and the objective facts reveal that Mr. Crapo 
impulsively acted out of shame and guilt of having been caught 
stealing from his employer. Mr. Crapo clearly understood the 
purpose and effect of twice loading a shotgun, placing the barrel 
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in his mouth, and pulling the trigger. Accordingly, Mr. Crapo 
did not sustain an injury by accident under the Workers' 
Compensation Act as defined in Allen. 
The Workers' Compensation Act provides that compensation 
will not be provided if the injury was "purposely self 
inflicted." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988). The Commission 
properly adopted the facts and legal reasoning of the ALJ's 
Order, concluding that Mr. Crapo's injuries from his attempted 
suicide were "purposely self-inflicted" and therefore non-
compensable. The findings of the Commission are supported by 
substantial evidence. Moreover, Mr. Crapo has failed to marshall 
the evidence to show otherwise. The Industrial Commission 
correctly interpreted the term "purposeful" as requiring an 
intentional act. 
The Commission's application of these facts to the law is 
reasonable and rational. The Commission's conclusion that Mr. 
Crapo's injuries were "purposely self-inflicted" was based on the 
fact that Mr. Crapo clearly understood the purpose and effect of 
loading a shotgun, placing the barrel of the gun in his mouth and 
pulling the trigger. There is no evidence that Mr. Crapo was 
suffering from a mental illness which so disordered his mind that 
he could not form the intention to take his own life. Rather, 
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the psychologist's report states that Mr. Crapo acted impulsively 
from feelings of shame and guilt at having been caught stealing 
from his employer. Further, case law from other jurisdictions 
supports the Commission's conclusion that attempted suicide is 
intentional and purposeful and therefore not compensable. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT EXPRESSLY BARS MR. 
CRAPO'S CLAIM. 
The central issue in this case is whether the Industrial 
Commission properly concluded that Mr. Crapo's injuries, which 
resulted from his attempted suicide, were "purposely self-
inflicted." This case is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 
which states in pertinent part: 
Each employee mentioned in § 35-1-43 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee who is 
killed, by accident arising out of in the course of his 
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposely self inflicted, shall be 
paid compensation . . . . 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
A. Mr. Crapo's attempted suicide does not constitute an 
"accident" as defined by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Allen v. Industrial Commission. 
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, the Utah Supreme Court 
defined the term "accident" as used in the Workers' Compensation 
Act as an "unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either 
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the cause or the result of an injury." 729 P.2d 15, 22 (Utah 
1986)(emphasis in original). In the present case, the ALJ 
correctly determined that the cause of Mr. Crapo's injury "was 
his impulsive act, whereby he attempted to commit suicide." (R. 
at 134.) As the ALJ concluded, " [c]ertainly, [Mr.] Crapo 
expected injury to occur to himself as the result of placing a 
shotgun in his mouth and pulling the trigger." (R. at 134.) 
(Emphasis added.) Further, the cause of Mr. Crapo's injury was 
intentional as demonstrated by the fact that "after firing [the 
shotgun] once, [Mr. Crapo] placed another round in the chamber" 
but was unable to fire a second time because he had "placed the 
shell in the chamber upside down." (R. at 134.) 
There is no assertion that Mr. Crapo was suffering from a 
delusional or psychotic episode. While Mr. Crapo's acts may have 
been impulsive, they were also clearly intentional. The Missouri 
Court of Appeals in Kolde v. St. Louis County noted that while 
"self-destruction is never prompted by a normal mind. . . . a 
suicide is intentional if it is done with sufficient mental power 
to know the purpose and effect of the act." 809 S.W.2d 14, 16 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1991). In Kolde, the widow of a police officer 
appealed the denial of her claim for workers' compensation death 
benefits. Her late husband was a fifteen-year veteran of the 
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city policy department and had died, while on duty within his 
assigned patrol area, from a self-inflicted single gunshot wound. 
The claimant's theory for recovery was that "the stress of the 
job combined with humiliation from superior officers . . . caused 
[the employee] to take his own life." Id. The court denied the 
claim, concluding that the facts supported a finding of 
intentional suicide since there was no contention that the 
employee had become insane or that his mind had become so 
disordered that he could not form the intention to take his own 
life. Id. Accord Rooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 887 
S.W.2d 671, 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming the denial of the 
widow's claim for death benefits on the basis that the decedent 
"knew the purpose and effect of pointing the shotgun at his 
stomach and pulling the trigger.") 
Similarly, in the present case, the facts support the 
Industrial Commission's conclusion that Mr. Crapo was aware of 
the purpose and effect of twice loading a shotgun, placing the 
barrel in his mouth, and pulling the trigger. Neither the cause 
nor the result of Mr. Crapo's injuries was unintended or 
unexpected. The Industrial Commission's application of the law 
under Allen to the facts of this case is reasonable and rational. 
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Accordingly, this court should affirm the Industrial Commission's 
Order. 
B. Mr. Crapo's injuries arising from his attempted suicide 
were "purposely self-inflicted." 
The Commission adopted the factual findings and legal 
reasoning outlined in the ALJ's Order and concluded that the 
injuries Mr. Crapo's sustained from his attempted suicide were 
purposely self-inflicted. The term "purposely" is not defined in 
the Workers Compensation Act. Blacks Law Dictionary defines 
"purposely" as "intentionally, designedly, consciously, [or] 
knowingly." In the present case, the Industrial Commission, 
through adopting the ALJ's Order, interpreted the term 
"purposely" to require an intentional act by Mr. Crapo (R. at 
133-134).5 Applying the law to the factual findings, the ALJ 
concluded that Mr. Crapo's attempted suicide was an intentional, 
5
 For example, the ALJ's Order contains the following 
references: "The statutory provision set forth above is clear; in 
the event Mr. Crapo's gunshot wound was intentional or purposely 
self inflicted, he is not entitled to compensation."; "The ALJ is 
aware of no case law which provides that being overcome by guilt 
would absolve the applicant from being responsible for his own 
intentional act."; "There is no case law in Utah which defines 
whether an attempted suicide is intentional in nature. However, 
other jurisdictions have examined this issue, and have concluded 
that attempted suicide is intentional and purposeful and, 
therefore, not compensable." (R. at 133-134.) (Emphasis 
supplied). 
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purposeful act. Judge Allen stated, " [c]ertainly, Crapo expected 
injury to occur to himself as the result of placing a shotgun in 
his mouth and pulling the trigger." (R. at 134.) The ALJ 
particularly noted that "after firing once, [Mr. Crapo] placed 
another round in the chamber, but fortunately for the applicant, 
he placed the shell in the chamber upside down. Therefore, it 
seems fair to conclude that the applicant's injury was 'purposely 
self-inflicted,' in light of his attempt to fire not once but 
twice." (R. at 134.) The ALJ explained: 
there was no evidence to suggest that anyone 
recommended to the applicant that he should, in anyway, 
injure himself. In fact, the applicant knew that 
Wareholse [sic] Entertainment was not going to press 
charges as long as the merchandise was returned. It 
would seem that the only logical conclusion for the 
applicant's conduct is that he was overcome by guilt. 
The Administrative Law Judge is aware of no case law 
which provides that being overcome by guilt would 
absolve the applicant from being responsible for his 
own intentional act. 
(R. at 134.) 
Defendants submit that a plain reading of the statute must 
be followed. That Mr. Crapo's injury was purposely self-
inflicted is seen in the following particulars: 
1. The suicide attempt occurred in the privacy of Mr. 
Crapo's own home. (R. at 216.) 
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2. Mr. Crapo knew the proper use of the shotgun. (R. at 
218. ) 
3. Mr. Crapo deliberately loaded his own 20-gauge shotgun 
for the purpose of attempting suicide (compared to an accidental 
"I didn't know it was loaded" theory). (R. at 134.) 
3. Mr. Crapo deliberately placed the end of the shotgun in 
his mouth and deliberately pulled the trigger (versus it went off 
"accidentally"). (R. at 219.) 
4. After firing once, Mr. Crapo placed another round in 
the chamber and attempted to shoot himself again. Fortunately, 
however, he had placed the shell in the chamber upside down and 
the gun did not fire a second time. (R. at 219.) 
5. Mr. Crapo has a family history of suicide. Mr. Crapo 
admitted in his deposition that his great grandfather, Vern 
Crapo, committed suicide, and that his grandfather, Ron Crapo, 
attempted suicide. (R. at 225.) According to Dr. McCann, Mr. 
Crapo had previously "experienced some transient suicidal 
ideation while undergoing some adjustments related to college." 
(Rpt. of Dr. McCann at 2.) While Dr. McCann thought that this 
ideation was within the normal range of experience for young 
people of his age, it certainly points to the non-accidental 
nature of the injury. 
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Mr. Crapo's suicide attempt was not based on 
psychiatric factors; rather, he was overwhel.rn.ed with shame at 
h a^  n i lg betrayed 1 t i 3 fai: 1 i.:i ] } ? a3 1 les 1: } ste al :i 1: lg Th 2 s ana] y s:i s :il s 
made clear by 1. McCann: 
The essential psychological factors in this case 
are as follows: Chad, in a moment of weakness broke 
the law. He knew he was breaking the law. Such 
behavior was contrary to his personal and family 
values, but pressure from peers and basic temptation 
took over and he committed acts that he knew were 
wrong. After he was confronted and then taken under 
supervision to his home, his family values emerged and 
he was overwhelmed with shame. He impulsively 
developed overwhelming self-destructive feelings and 
unfortunately there was a firearm ready and near at 
hand. Studies have shown that in circumstances of teen 
suicide, the only consistent factor is the availability 
of a lethal weapon at a time of crisis, not psychiatric 
factors. 
Chad's father, a family attorney, and myself have 
all made it very clear to Chad that he is responsible 
for having broken the law and taking the merchandise 
and it also was only he, who picked up the gun and made 
the decision, no matter how irrational, to turn it on 
himself. Chad, seems to be accepting his responsibility 
in this matter and I believe 2 s making significant 
personal growth. 
(Rpt. of Dr. McCann. at 3-4.) 
Defend a n t s ' p :: s :i t: :i D 1 1 :i s f u 1 t: 1 1 e 1: s u p p o 1: t: e d 1: } a I.J t a 1 1 S u p r e m e 
Court decision, McKay-Dee Hospital v. Industrial Commission, 598 
P. 2d 375 (Utah 1979).. In McKay-Dee Hospital, the applicant's 
inji rry occurred in a moment of anger when he broke h i s hand b> 
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slamming his fist into a metal door. Obviously, Mr. Crapo's act 
of placing a 20-gauge shotgun in his mouth and pulling the 
trigger is even more purposely self-inflicted than the 
applicant's act in McKay-Dee Hospital. 
Mr. Crapo attacks the validity of the decision in McKay-Dee 
Hospital. quoting Professor Larson's criticism of the court's 
reasoning. Even assuming this criticism, however, the particular 
facts of the present case clearly support the conclusion that Mr. 
Crapo's injuries were purposely self-inflicted. Mr. Crapo did 
more than just pull the trigger of the shotgun. He sought out 
the shotgun. He knew the purpose and proper use of a shotgun. 
He placed a shell in the chamber of the gun, not once, but two 
times, and he placed the end of the shotgun in his mouth. These 
actions are clearly more purposeful and deliberate that the act 
of hitting a metal cabinet with one's hand. Fortunately, Mr. 
Crapo's intended suicide was unsuccessful. 
Furthermore, in a similar case from another jurisdiction, 
the court concluded that attempted suicide is intentional and 
purposeful, and, therefore, not compensable. In Henry v. Schenk 
Mechanical Contractors. 346 N.E.2d 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976), Mr. 
Henry was scheduled to report to work at 8:00 a.m. on April 26, 
1971. He arrived at work at approximately 7:30 a.m., and no 
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other employees had yet arrived, Hei iry wa^: discovered shortly 
thereafter, lying in a. bathroom area of the premises, wounded and 
unconscious. n e m --n----- ' \ c '•-] : - -• ^ ' - .• 
Schenk's business. The business was not successful Financial 
problems caused M^in
 t I < • U;i I < >w money i i > »in hi.-:, mother to keep the 
business going, and he was finally forced to sell the business to 
Schenk in December of 1970 at a disappointing price Henry was 
extremely despoi idei it: fc>] ] < DWJ ng t:l :i :i , 3 i 11 lhapp^ t/i 11: 1 1 • : f e^  ? ents ,1 dL_ 
at 618. 
Henry stayed on as an employee of Schenk. Henry was 
extremely distraught over the low price that he had rece: •'- i ~: n 
exchange for the business. On the morning of April 26, 1971, Mr, 
Ken: - * -. • i c 1 :i :i s a p .\ C t: 1 1 a t e d, g 1 11: 1 ] i k e 
device, mainly used 101 fastening extremely hard substances (i.e. 
steel-to-steel, wood-to-steel ), to his head and shot a nail 
thrr ..;•--.-. 
Henry survives
 : :<i : :l^d a petition for workers compensation 
b e n e f i t s TI: 1 • 3 11 1 d i a 1 1 a C D 1 11: t o f Ap p e a 1 s c o 1 1 c 1 u d e d t h a t. M 2: 
Henry's injury was not compensable in that his attempted suicide 
was an intentional act and that Mr. Henry was responsible for his 
c • wn cond 1 1 ct See also Rooks , 88 7 S \ \lr 2d at 6 7 1 (de 1 1 ia 1 of 
benefits proper where claimant understood the purpose and effect 
of shooting himself in the stomach); and Kolde, 809 S.W.2d at 15 
(denial of benefits proper where decedent understood the purpose 
and effect of pointing his gun at his forehead and pulling the 
trigger). 
In the present case, the facts are substantially similar to 
those in Henry. Mr. Crapo did not attempt suicide for any reason 
other than the guilt that he felt for having been caught stealing 
from his employer. The facts support the ALJ's conclusion that 
Mr. Crapo understood the purpose and effect of placing the shells 
in the chamber of the shotgun, placing the barrel of the shotgun 
in his mouth, and pulling the trigger. As such, Mr. Crapo is not 
entitled to benefits. 
Mr. Crapo asserts that he presented "prima facie" 
evidence that his injuries from his attempted suicide were not 
"purposely self-inflicted," and he asks this Court to remand the 
case for a full evidentiary hearing. (Appellant's Brief at 22.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has observed that "[a]dministrative 
proceedings are usually conducted with greater flexibility and 
informality than judicial proceedings. Rigid adherence to 
judicial procedures is generally inappropriate because it ignores 
basic differences between judicial and administrative 
procedures." Pilcher v. State of Utah, 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 
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1.983). At the time of the original hearing, the parties agreed 
that the depositions and file material contained all of the 
informat:i oi i necessai y fo:i : 11 1 e I \ I iJ t o i : i i] B OI i t: 1 Ie :i ssues :i rI the 
case. The ALJ reviewed these materials in preparing his Findings 
: 'f F 'act, Conclusions c: . .aw and Order. The i nterpretation of the 
facts which Mr. Crapo presents for this Court are trie "*-• 
he presented below to the ALJ and the Industrial Commission 
Crapo fiai Iniifl" n n| piuiil beluw, ; , - . JL_- .a__ed 
to marshall the evidence on appeal. Accordingly, his appeal 
should be denied and the Industrial Commission's order affirmed. 
j j ^
 G e n e r a-[_ c a s e i i «, ., |,, 11 ,,. | rl , mm 
Mr. Crapo quotes extensively from Professor Larson's 
11: e a t i s e i i I s u p p o rt • D f 1 i i s c 1 a i i t: t i'he Lull owi ng s t a tu t ory 
background and summary comes directly from Larson: 
Suicide may be made the basis of a defense against 
a compensation claim in several ways. The most direct 
is reliance on the specific defense, present in 41 
state statutes and the Longshoremen's and United States 
Employee's Compensation Act, of suicide or intentional 
self injury. It may also be argued that: suicide does 
not arise out of the employment, since the source of 
harm is personal. It can be said that suicide is not 
accidental, but rather intentional. It could even be 
argued that suicide is a. departure indeed the most 
irrevocable and final of all possible departures - from 
the course of employment. 
At the outset, there must be found an injury wii:i « ::1 i 
itself arose out of and in the course of employment, 
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and then the suicide must be traced directly to it. If 
there is no such employment-connected injury setting in 
motion the causal sequence leading to the suicide, the 
suicide is a complete defense. Thus, when an employee 
was observed running through the plant clutching his 
head in pain, and was later found to have thrown 
himself out of a window, compensation was denied 
because there was no industrial injury as the initial 
cause. 
Most cases in this field present the same pattern 
of facts: a severe, or extremely painful, or 
hopelessly incurable injury, followed by a deranged 
mental state ranging from depression to violent lunacy, 
followed in turn by suicide. The basic legal question 
seems to be agreed upon by almost all authorities. It 
is whether the act of suicide was an intervening cause 
breaking the chain of causation between the initial 
injury and the death. The only controversy involves 
the kind or degree of mental disorder which will lead a 
court to say that the self destruction was not an 
independent intervening cause. 
1 Authur Larson, Larson's Workmen's Compensation, Desk Edition, § 
36.10, at 6-61 to -62 (1995). 
As seen from the foregoing analysis, Mr. Crapo's attempted 
suicide will not be compensable. Mr. Crapo clearly did not have 
"a severe, or extremely painful, or hopelessly incurable injury." 
He had not sustained an accident or injury.6 Moreover, he was 
6
 A few courts have allowed benefits in very particular 
circumstances when there has been a prior mental injury which 
culminated in the employee's suicide. All of these cases, 
however, have involved very serious psychiatric conditions which 
were brought on or aggravated by working conditions. See, e.g.. 
City of Scranton v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 583 A.2d 
852 (1990) (major depressive episode with congruent psychotic 
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not in a "deranged mental state ranging from depression to 
violent. 3 i ma 2} r " According to Di: McCann, psychiatric factors 
did not play a part in Mr. Crapo's suicide attempt. Rather, he 
had been confronted with having stolen merchandise from his 
emp 1 oyer , Arico r 1111-1 " - " " IM- ' " i , Mi . Crapo " s shame at I la v ing 
broken the law and his family values led to his attempted 
suicide. Shame at having stolen merchandise cannot be deemed an 
industrial accident, nor is 1 L a -nor:^ ].-- i-*-! •*-.,- '• / " 
Rather, Mi Crapo committed the impulsive a • of a teenager and 
:i s -
 t .. :. p3 < ^  , - - i c, , j.. cosmetic 
medical bill because ^ o ^wi* insurance carrier does not cover 
suicide attempts Because Utah is in tho majority of 
J ' -" " ' — -•: 1 - f — i '-
inflicted iniurv. this Court should tolJow * ..-> majority rule and 
affirm the .laustrial Commission's Order'. 
features); Burnight v. in ACC. Comm,n, 1 Cal. Rptr. 786 
(1960) (manic depressive u.^^±d^r); Wilder v. Russell Library 
Company, 139 A. 644 (1927) (nervous breakdown). Mr. Crapo's 
brief seems to state that, although he may not have sustained a 
prior industrial physical injury, he sustained a mental, injury as 
a result of the alleged "intense interrogation" and 
"incarceration." However, Dr. McCann's report evidences that, 
while Mr. Crapo may have been very upset by having to face up to 
his mistake, he did not suffer from any psychiatric injury. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah has specific statutory and case law authority which 
precludes Mr. Crapo's claim. Mr. Crapo did not sustain an 
"injury by accident" as defined by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Allen. Rather, Mr. Crapo knew and understood the purpose and 
effect of his attempted suicide. The cause and the result of his 
injuries were neither unexpected nor unintended. Furthermore, 
the Industrial Commission correctly concluded that the 
Applicant's injuries were "purposely self-inflicted." The 
Industrial Commission correctly interpreted the term "purposely" 
to require an intentional act by Mr. Crapo. The Industrial 
Commission's finding that Mr. Crapo's suicide was an intentional 
act is supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, Applicant 
has failed to meet his threshold burden of marshalling the 
evidence in his attack of the Commission's findings. Finally, 
the Industrial Commission's application of the law to the facts 
of this case was reasonable and rationale. Mr. Crapo may have 
acted impulsively, but this does not vitiate the intentional 
nature of his actions. Mr. Crapo was not suffering from a 
psychiatric disorder at the time of the injury. Instead, as Dr. 
McCann reported, Mr. Crapo acted out of guilt and shame for 
having been caught stealing from his employer. As the 
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Administrative Law Judge concluded, there is no case law which 
provides that be:i nci < : vercome by g i :i :i ] t: ; ; :i ] ] abso] \ e I Ii C:i apo f:r om 
being responsible for* his own intentional act. For this same 
reasoi 1 Defendants respectfully submit that the Industrial 
Commission's Order should be affirmed and Mr Crapo's appeal 
denied. 
RESPECTFULLY suUii J t.Led im,, __jJ__ da) I.MMI, i^n, 
MICHAEL E. DYER ff 
DORI K. PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc. 
and ITT Hartford 
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JAMES R. BLACK 
JAMES R. BLACK & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Petitioner Chad Crapo 
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ALAN L. HENNEBOLD 
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Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ri'NDTNGS HK FA<'"T 
CONCLUSION^ OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: Hearing Room 32-i, Industrial Commission of 
h, 160 East 300 S o u t; - S a 11 Lake City, 
,h, on June 2, 1995, at 8,30 o'clock p.m., 
..._: same being pursuant to Order and Notice of 
the Commissi ci:. 
BEFORE; .onorable Timothy 
nistrative Law Jt.da-
Allen, presidxng 
^EARANCES: applicant wdb represen* 
Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were io\ 
Attorney at Law 
lit-~ 
At the time and place set for the evidentiary hearing in this 
matter; it was determined by the Presiding Law Judge and the 
parties, by and through counsel, that an evidentiary hearing would 
not be required at this time, in that the threshold issue involved 
in this case is a legal one. Specifically, the defendants have 
made a Motion to Dism iss the Application for Hearing on the grounds 
that the claimed industrial injury of May 19, 1994. was "purposely 
self-inflicted", and accordingly, not compensable based on the 
plain language in §35-1-45 Utah Code Annotated. The parties agreed 
that the Administrative Law Judge could determine the issue based 
on the hearing memoranda prepared by the parties, and depositions 
of the applicant and of Emily Smith. Having reviewed those 
pleadings and depositions and the file contained in this matter, I 





FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant herein, Chad Crapo, was employed by Warehouse 
Entertainment is a sales clerk. In April of 1994, the applicant 
and the assistant manager of the store, one Sean Dalton, started 
stealing various items from the store. Those items consisted of 
three CD disks, one Sony disk player, and four laser disks. The 
applicant ai^o at this time, was giving unauthorized employee 
discounts to frequent customers of the store, and was also observed 
stuffing voided receipts in the ceiling of the store by Ms. Smith. 
Because of these thefts, Ms. Smith contacted the Loss Control 
Manager for her region, Jeff Gimber. Gimber instructed Smith to 
observe the applicants activities, and to compile a file. After 
Ms. Smith observed the applicant stuffing receipts into the ceiling 
of the store af^ .er hours, she contacted Gimber and Gimber informed 
her that he would come up to Utah from southern California, the 
following day. 
On May 19, 1994, Gimber reported to the store, and Smith 
instructed the applicant to report to the District Manager's 
office, which was in the back portion of the store. There, the 
applicant was confronted by Gimber about the thefts that had been 
taking pia^e at the store. After being informed that the police 
-sou Li be involved, the applicant confessed that he had been 
stealing items from the store and giving discounts to customers. 
Gimber then instructed Smith to accompany the applicant to his home 
for the purpose of retrieving the stolen merchandise. Although 
Smith fait that it was not her role to function as a police 
of£icer; 3ha nonetheless did what her superior, Gimber, instructed 
her to do, The applicant was upset during the interrogation, and 
was crying and was emotional. 
After Gimber ordered Smith to drive the applicant to his home 
for the purpose of recovering the merchandise, the applicant 
resisted^ suggesting that he could be trusted to bring the 
merchandise back. Gimber scoffed at Smith's suggestion, 
responding, in effect, how .could the applicant be trusted when he 
had been caught stealing, Prior to leaving the store, the 
applicant was left alone for approximately twenty minutes so he 
could write a "confession", which he did, and which was admitted 
into evidence as Exhibit D-2. 
On the trip to his home, the applicant was crying and 
apologized to the store manager, Ms. Smith. Upon arrival at his 
home, the applicant asked to be excused to go to the bathroom. He 
then went alone to a room attached to the garage, where he kept a 
20 gauje shotgun which had been given to him by his grandfather. 
Upon entering the room, the applicant placed the shotgun _in his 





a o p 1 ican - ~. - - .~ * « « *. +, *~ *
 A ^  v^.>^ o 01 uwm^ _ tCUC;LIi aI*^ « %-> *i 
of his jaw. In his claim, the applicant alleges that his sui .uw. 
attempt \as a*- repulsive act that xcurre' rn th- spur of the 
moment 
;ne defendants have urged that this claim be dismissed based 
o * ni^ir. language of §35-1-45, wh ; ~u rr- --ides as foil ows : 
Each employee inei itioi \ h i §3 5-1-43
 i who is in_ 
I the dependents of each such employee wh 
II ] € ci, b y a c c i d e n t, a r i s i n g o u t o £ a n d • the 
ii : 3' s of his employment, wherever such i n j ury 
: • • ed, if the accident was not—purposely sei£^ 
inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss 
sustained on account of the i njury or deatJ-
(Emphasis added). 
The issue in the instant case ^ «net::ar Cra,w . ,r,./t^,^ijZed 
Icide constitutes an accident which "was not purposely self-
inflicted," The statutory provision set forth above is clear; in 
the event CrapoJs gunshot wound was intentional and purposely self-
inf lioted, he is not entitled to compensation. Section 45 and its 
self-inflicted provision has been interpreted by the Utah Supreme 
Court in the case of MacKay Dee Hospital vs. Industrial Commission, 
59S ?2d .3 7 5 (Utah 19 79) , In that case, the injured employee, 
Spademan, had a disagreement with a supervisor, and became angry 
and slammed his fist into a metal door, thereby breaking his hand. 
In denying benefits, the court concluded that when the applicant 
slammed his fist against the metal door, it was foreseeable and 
expected that injury would result to the applicantf s * hand, the 
injury was therefore not an accident and not compensable. 
The applican t has u. j-u the presiding Law Judge to make a 
finding that the result in the MacKay Dee decision is a bad 
ision as urged by Professor Larson, a recognized authority in 
kers compensation law. While the Administrative Law Judge has 
,*jat respect for Professor Larson and his oft-quoted treatise, 
LarsQn's Workman? Compensation Law, i t must be pointed out that 
Professor Larson is not an appropriate appellate court that I may 
cite or rely upon as support for my overturning or setting aside of 
the MacKay Dee decision, as appears to be ui ged by the applicant. 
It is well settled that the Industrial Commission is 
administrative agency, that exercises quasi-judicial functions ci 
a limited jurisdictional nature. I can find nothing in the Workers 
Compensation Act, which would illcw the undersigned or the 
Commission to overturn or set aside any decision of the Utah Court 




bad the decision may be in the Administrative Law Judge's opinion 
or in Professor Larson's opinion; the only opinion that counts is 
that of the Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court. Therefore, 
I must decline applicant's invitation to find that the Mackay Dee 
decision is no longer in effect because it is arguably a bad 
decision. 
The applicant also argues that §45, itself, provides no 
definition of "accident", and that therefore the Allen decision 
must be consulted to determine if the applicant had a compensable 
industrial accident. The applicant goes on to argue that the 
occurrence that caused his injury was neither expected nor 
intended. The applicant urges that the occurrence that caused the 
injury is alleged to be the interrogation. However, the 
Administrative Law Judge finds that the occurrence that caused the 
applicant's injury was his impulsive act, whereby he attempted to 
commit suicide. Certainly, Crapo expected injury to occur to 
himself as the result of placing a shotgun in his mouth and pulling 
the trigger, In fact, the applicant's deposition indicated that 
he, after firing once, placed another round in the chamber, but 
fortunately for the applicant, he placed the shell in the chamber 
upside down, Therefore, it seems fair to conclude that the 
applicant's injury was "purposely self-inflicted", in light of his 
attempt ti iLre not once but twice. 
Further, there was no evidence to suggest that anyone 
recommended to the applicant that he should, in anyway, injure 
himself. la fact, the applicant knew that Warehouse Entertainment 
was not going to press charges as long as the merchandise was 
returned. It would seem that the only logical conclusion for the 
applicant's conduct is that he was overcome by guilt. The 
Administrative Law Judge is aware of no case law which provides 
that being overcome by guilt would absolve the applicant from being 
responsible for his own intentional act. 
There is no case law in Utah which defines whether an 
attempted suicide is intentional in nature. However, other 
jurisdictions have examined this issue, and have concluded that 
attempted suicide is intentional and purposeful and, therefore, not 
compensable, In particular, the case of Henry vs . Schenk 
Mechanical Contractors, 346 NE 2d 616 (Indiana, 1976) is directly 
on point. In Henry, Mr. Henry was scheduled to report to work at 
8:00 a.m. on April 26, 1971. He arrived at work at approximately 
7:30, and no other employees had arrived yet, Mr. Henry was 
discovered shortly thereafter, lying in a bathroom area of the 
premises, wounded and unconscious, Henry later testified to having 
previously owned Schenk?s business. The business was not 
successful. Financial problems caused Henry to borrow money from 





sell the business to Schenk in December of 1970, at a disappointing 
price, Henry was extremely despondent following this unhappy turn 
of events. Id, at 618. 
Henry stayed on as an employee of Schenk. Henry was extremely 
distraught over the money that he had received in exchange for the 
business. On the morning of April 26, 1971, Mr. Henry placed a Ram 
Set tooL, which is a gunpowder actuated, gunlike device, used 
mainly for fastening extremely hard substances, e.g. steel to 
steel, steel to concrete, etc., to his head. He then pressed the 
trigger shooting a nail through both temples of his head. 
Henry filed a claim for workers compensation benefits. The 
Indiana Court of Appeals concluded that Henry's injury was not 
compensable in that the attempted suicide was an intentional act, 
that it was not the result of a previous work-related injury, and 
that Mr. Henry was responsible for his own conduct. 
In the instant case, the facts are strikingly similar to those 
in Henry. Crapo did not attempt suicide for any reason other than 
the fact that he had been caught stealing from his employer. There 
was no preceding compensable injury which led to the suicide. As 
such; based on the foregoing reasoning, Crapo is not entitled to 
benefits. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant's injuries were purposely self-inflicted, and 
therefore, pursuant to §35-1-45/ are not compensable, There are no 
cases on point in Utah defining whether attempted suicide is 
compensable. However, other jurisdictions which have examined the 
issue have concluded that
 N individuals who have engaged in self-
inflicted, purposeful conduct are not entitled to compensation. 
Finally, the Administrative Law Judge does not possess the 
requisite jurisdictional authority, statutory or otherwise, to set 
aside or overturn the decision in MacKay Dee Hospital YS^ 
Industrial Commission as urged by applicant. Accordingly, the 






IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of Chad Crapo for 
workers compensation benefits as the result of an injury he 
sustained on May 19, 1994, should be, and the same is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice for the reason that the applicants injury 
was "purposely self-inflicted" and barred by the express terms of 
§45 of the Workers Compensation Act. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shaLl be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed; the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the 
date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written 
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b-
12(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
DATED: this 8th day of June, 1995. 
y Timothy (2^. a(llen 
* Presidir/g Administrative Law Judge 
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